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The	limitations	of	metric-fixation	in	healthcare
assessment	standards
Considering	the	Indian	context,	Deepanshu	Mohan	looks	at	the	counter-productive	nature	of	metric-
based	incentives	affecting	performance	in	the	healthcare	sector	with	some	comparative	anecdotes	from
the	United	States.
The	traditional	wisdom	on	studying	the	impact	performance	of	various	social	and	economic	policies	in
formal	institutions	and	governance	systems	often	relies	on	hard-core	measurement	data	indicators	for
evaluating	performance	and	(re)designing	policies	using	data-centred	analytical	perspectives.	The	excessive	reliance
on	data	extraction	and	its	validation	by	public	policy	practitioners	across	countries	(including	India)	raise	some	vital
questions	on	what	works	and	doesn’t	work	in	improving	access	to	public	services	like	healthcare,	education,	policing
etc.	and	to	what	extent	incentives	(or	deterrences)	decidedly	solely	on	the	basis	of	(pre)defined	metrics	may
culminate	into	counter-productive	results.	As	a	case	in	point	to	the	Indian	context,	this	article	looks	at	the	counter-
productive	nature	of	metric-based	incentives	affecting	performance	in	the	healthcare	sector	with	some	comparative
anecdotes	from	the	United	States.
How	we	can	define	Metric-Fixation
“What	gets	measured	gets	done”	is	a	traditional	credo	of	measured	performance,	which	Jerry	Muller	in	his	book	The
Tyranny	of	Metrics	calls	the	“metric	fixation”.	The	theological,	almost	faith-based	arrogance	on	using	a	metrical
canon	for	resolving	problems	with	a	social	dimension,	according	to	Muller,	has	now	developed	into	an	institutional
dogma	affecting	the	relationship	between	measurement	and	performance	particularly	in	areas	of	public	services	such
as	healthcare,	education	and	policing.
In	his	book,	Muller	outlines	three	tenets	to	the	metrical	canon:	the	first,	involves	acknowledging	a	set	of	indicators
used	for	measuring	comparative	performance	from	standardized	data	while	replacing	judgment	acquired	through
personal	experiences	and	observational	behavior;	the	second,	involves	making	such	metrics	public	to	ensure
transparency	and	accountability	of	public	institutions,	mandated	to	provide	public	services	(example,	education	and
healthcare);	and	third,	managing	monetary	incentives	and	rewards,	mapped	directly	with	results	analyzed	from
metrics	in	the	quest	to	improve	measured	performance.
All	these	three	tenets	of	using	(data-centric)	metrics	are	considered	essential	by	policymakers,	politicians	to	marry
‘good	intentions	to	managerial	techniques’.	“Measure,	monitor	and	remunerate”	as	the	Trinitarian	formula	thus,
becomes	a	panacea	for	tackling	all	problems	including	those	with	a	social	dimension,	influenced	by	norms,	cultural
practices.	However,	on	a	careful	analysis,	one	can	identify	counter-effects	of	such	metric	based	incentive
(deterrence)	pattern	in	India’s	(and	US)	medical	system.
Arathana	Hospital,	Tamil	Nadu.	Photo	credit:	Mohan	Mols,	CC	BY-SA	4.0.
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India’s	Health	Care	Assessment
If	we	take	the	case	of	India’s	healthcare	system,	comprising	of	a	complex	web	of	different	medical	establishments	in
form	of	clinics,	hospitals,	government	agencies,	insurance	companies	etc.	across	rural-urban	areas,	there	are
significant	supply-demand	side	constraints	circumscribing	access	to	(primary,	secondary,	tertiary)	medical	services	of
a	reasonable	quality	at	an	affordable	rate.
Metrics	of	per-capita	spending	on	healthcare,	mortality	rates	and	life	expectancy	(as	argued	here)	do	reflect	the
asymmetric	state	of	healthcare	access	across	states,	rural	and	urban	areas	in	India.	However,	a	closer	analysis	on
identifying	some	causes	and	reasons	for	the	proliferating	incidence	of	communicable/non-communicable	diseases	or
a	weak	doctor-patient	relationship	etc.	reflect	how	such	commonly	studied	healthcare	performance	metrics	alone
cannot	explain	the	systemic	nature	of	medical	concerns	affecting	India’s	demography.
In	an	article	written	last	year,	I	argued	how	access	to	quality	healthcare	access	in	rural	areas	across	Bihar,	Madhya
Pradesh,	West	Bengal	and	some	parts	of	Rajasthan	remain	influenced	by	a	common	perception	(amongst	people	in
rural	areas)	that	proper	diagnosis	and	medical	service	is	only	available	in	district	hospitals	which	are	located	at	a
much	farther	distance,	regardless	of	whether	a	well-operational	primary	healthcare	facility	is	situated	nearby.
Das	and	Mohpal	in	a	similar	study	conducted	a	few	years	ago	also	observed	a	stark	divergence	between	“medical
qualifications	and	knowledge”	amongst	doctors	available	(in	above	states)	with	their	“knowledge	and	practice”	(in
terms	of	antibiotics	prescribed	for	treatment).	The	study,	implicitly	highlighted	significant	methodological	limitations	in
understanding	the	quantum	and	nature	of	medical	problems	across	the	country.
In	other	words,	ensuring	a	‘reasonable’	number	of	medical	doctors	to	provide	primary,	secondary	care	to	people	in
rural	(semi-urban)	areas	from	a	metric-based	assessment	may	not	be	sufficient	in	improving	medical	outcomes,	as
desired.	One	also	needs	to	incorporate	social	and	cultural	factors	into	the	domain	of	analytical	reasoning	to	get	to	the
root	of	the	problem;	for	example,	water,	sanitation	treatment	and	their	use	bear	strong	correlation	with
individual/group	lifestyles	and	choices	and	their	overall	quality	of	life	which	is	rarely	captured	from	metric-fixated
reasoning.
In	case	of	India,	while	policymakers	may	advise	the	government	to	keep	spending	more	(from	a	lower-per	capita
spending)	by	increasing	the	number	of	medical	facilities	in	rural	and	urban	areas,	ultimately,	the	reduction	in	chronic
ailments	(such	as	diabetes,	typhoid	etc.)	or	water-borne	diseases	require	substantial	changes	in	socio-cultural
practices	with	graduated	(policy)	measures.
One	can	draw	a	similar	case	in	reference	to	the	US	medical	situation	too.	As	per	international	standard,	the	US
medical	system	(as	argued	here)	is	highly	successful	in	diagnosing	and	treating	most	diseases.	However,	mortality
and	life	expectancy	rates	in	the	US	too	are	largely	explained	by	factors	outside	the	medical	system	which	bear	strong
correlations	with	food	consumption	practices,	other	cultural	lifestyles.	The	rapid	rise	of	obesity	amongst	Americans
(and	other	countries)	remains	connected	to	a	widely	prevalent	consumerist	culture	of	(over)eating	high	calorie-intake
fatty	foods	which	have	increased	the	incidence	of	chronic	illnesses	such	as	Type-2	diabetes	and	cardio	diseases.
Mapping	Rewards	&	Punishment
For	evaluating	the	performance	of	medical	institutions	too,	a	metrical	cannon	may	be	utilised	in	creating	(limiting)
incentives	that	may	culminate	into	undesired	outcomes.	For	example,	according	to	the	second	tenet	of	the	metrical
cannon-	medical	institutions’	performance	can	be	improved	through	transparency	and	accountability	by	making	all
“hospital	mortality	rates	public”.	In	the	US,	while	this	practice	was	adopted,	a	recent	study,	shows	how	“public
reporting	of	mortality	rates	has	had	no	impact	on	patient	outcomes”.
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Similarly,	in	India’s	state	of	West	Bengal,	the	adoption	of	the	West	Bengal	Clinical	Establishment	Act	in	2017,	intends
to	streamline	(healthcare)	regulations	with	procedures	on	medical	licensing,	generic	drug	pricing,	adjudicating	and
accounting	for	criminal	offences	related	to	medical	practice.	According	to	the	newly	enacted	Bill,	doctors	or
healthcare	facilities	may	face	criminal	proceedings	under	Indian	Penal	Code,	including	a	cancellation	of	their	medical
license,	if	found	guilty	of	medical	negligence.	The	Indian	Medical	Association	(IMA)	raised	strong	objections	to	this
clause	as	the	IMA	wants	a	single-window	accountability	for	doctors	to	reduce	the	scope	of	harassment	and	no
differentiation	in	treatment	between	the	private	sector	and	government-appointed	doctors.	Moreover,	a	stricter	law
and	high	criminal	deterrence	for	punishing	doctors	convicted	of	medical	negligence	may	prevent	doctors	(in	public	or
private	medical	facilities)	from	treating	patients	in	a	serious	medical	condition.
What	can	be	done?
A	system	incorporating	periodic	agency	feedback	on	effects	of	medical	practices	and	solutions,	mapped	with	group
(or	individual)	socio-cultural	practices	remain	key	to	addressing	healthcare	concerns	across	different	geographical
spaces.	Remedying	medical	problems	that	surface	from	societal	or	cultural	behavior	require	alternative	methods	for
initiating	long	term	(policy)	solutions	that	go	beyond	any	methodological	individualism	that	is	centered	on	a	metric-
fixated,	one-size-fits	all	belief.	More	qualitative	feedback	documented	to	analyze	the	performance	of	existing	policies
and/or	medical	institutions	help	us	in	assessing	what	works	and	doesn’t	work	in	the	domain	of	public-policy	analysis.
The	point	of	arguing	beyond	a	metrical	cannon	is	to	push	for	other	feedback	mechanisms	into	the	domain	of
analytical	reasoning	for	creating	improved	access	not	only	for	medical	services	but	also	in	areas	of		education	and
policing	(argued	here).	A	student’s	overall	grade	performance	is	just	one	of	the	indicators	for	her/his	(cap)ability	to	do
well	in	a	given	professional	task.	Qualitative	feedback	on	her/his	performance	during	the	interview	or	training	period
gives	employers	much	more	informational	certainty	on	her/his	capabilities	(beyond	the	grades	scored).
Data	driven	performance	measures	and	indicators	are	surely	beneficial	for	identifying	schemes	of	reward	and
punishment;	still,	diagnosis	of	individual/group/institutional	performance	warrants	us	to	incorporate	professional
experiences,	values	and	group	behavioral	attributes	to	initiate	longer	term	(social)	changes.	An	overt	reliance	on
metric	fixation	sans	a	systemic	process	of	monitoring	and	documenting	qualitative	feedback	during	cycles	of	a	given
policy	implementation,	thus,	is	likely	to	distort	the	very	rationale	of	designing	policies	for	the	common	good.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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